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1. Introduction
Since the refusal of the European Economic Area (EEA) treaty by the Swiss voters in
1992, the Swiss government followed a triple stage strategy to pursue integration with
the European Union (EU). In the short run, it adopted a series of unilateral measures
aimed at bringing Swiss regulations closer to European ones. In the long run, although it
had to freeze its candidacy, it never abandoned membership of the EU as its ultimate
objective. In the medium run, a less ambitious partnership was negotiated with the EU
whose obligations, known as the “Bilateral Agreements”, will be submitted to a new
referendum in May 2000. Although the debate goes beyond economic issues, it is of
crucial importance to understand the economic consequences of these strategies. What
are the likely economic effects for Switzerland of staying out, getting closer (through
the bilateral agreements) or of joining the EU? This paper proposes a simulation model
which identifies the various channels through which European integration is likely to
affect resource allocation and welfare.  Its distinguishing characteristic resides in the
variety of effects that are incorporated in the model and the decomposition of these
effects.
Several dimensions of the Swiss case make it particularly interesting, and applicable to
other applicants for membership. First, Swiss protection is still considerable in the case
of agricultural  goods  and food  products.  The  adoption  of  the  Common  Agricultural
Policy (CAP) in the case of EU  accession would thus imply drastic  changes in  the
protection of these sectors. Second, at present wage differentials, free labor movement
would lead to a net immigration flow. This will have important consequences for both
aggregate welfare and income distribution, depending not only on the total amount, but
also on the skill composition of the immigrant population. Third, fiscal compliance with
EU rules would mean an important contribution to the EU budget and a shift from direct
to  indirect  taxation.  Official  estimates  show  that  if  the  net  transfer  to  the  EU  was
financed  by  an  increase  of  the  rate  of  the  value  added  tax  (VAT)  to  the  European
minimum level, this would generate additional resources, allowing a reduction in the
income  tax  rate.  Fourth,  a  substantial  increase  in  interest  rates  can  be  expected  if
Switzerland  participates  in  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU).  Indeed,  the
elimination  of  the  exchange  rate  risk  should  make  it  impossible  to  maintain  lower
interest rates than in other European countries.2
While not all of these effects necessarily concern countries seeking membership in the
EU, they broadly apply to the new entrants of the recent enlargement and, to a lesser
extent, they are also pertinent to countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
that are currently negotiating membership. Indeed, including the effects of the CAP, the
VAT, as well as labor and capital mobility is necessary if one wishes to capture orders
of magnitude of membership accession into a deep regional integration scheme. This
paper proposes such a framework and applies it to the case of Switzerland.
The  simulation  model  has  been  designed  with  these  issues  in  mind,  and  has  two
specificities.  First,  it  reproduces  a  steady-state  equilibrium  where  investment  and
savings  decision  are  explicitly  modeled,  the  latter  on  the  basis  of  an  overlapping-
generations framework of the “perpetual youth” type (Blanchard, 1985). Savings and
capital formation are therefore endogenous, which is essential to capture the long-run
impact of fiscal reforms or changes in capital mobility on both aggregate welfare and
economic activity. Taking into account the degree of international capital mobility is of
special concern for a country like Switzerland where net foreign assets are a substantial
part of national wealth. Second, integration in the product markets is carefully modeled.
Whenever possible, ex-post (econometric) estimates of the impact of the Single Market
Program (SMP) are used as a benchmark for parameter values. This is particularly true
for the imperfectly competitive sectors, which are modeled along the lines of previous
studies of the SMP (see e.g. Haaland and Norman, 1992). Standardization is assumed to
increase  product  substitutability,  as  in  Harrison  et  al.  (1996).  However,  rather  than
imposing an arbitrary change in  parameter  values,  we  calibrate  the  variation  of  the
elasticity of substitution on the decrease in price-cost margins estimated ex-post by
Allen et al. (1997).
A number of additional characteristics of the model are also worthwhile mentioning.
First, the size asymmetry between Switzerland and the EU is a potential problem. It is
unrealistic, in the case of differentiated products, to assume that such a small country
produces the entire range of varieties of a good. Therefore, we account for the existence
of non-competing imports in each imperfect competition sector in Switzerland. Second,
to capture the redistributive dimension of reforms, we consider four labor categories,
according to the skill level. Third, for a certain number of Swiss sectors which are
excluded from the VAT base, investment would be penalized by an increase in indirect3
taxation. To control for this effect, the VAT in these sectors  has been modeled, not only
as a tax on final consumption, but also on intermediate consumption and investment.
Finally,  regarding  trade  in  non-agricultural  goods,  changes  for  Switzerland  will
probably  be  more  limited  than  those  experienced  in  the  past  by  other  European
economies. A free trade agreement was signed with the EU in 1972. Moreover, since
1994, the “Swisslex” program has brought important parts of Swiss law so close to EEA
law that technical barriers to Swiss-EU trade have been considerably reduced. Thus, in
this area, it can be expected that Switzerland would gain less from full EU membership
than EU countries did from the Single Market Program (SMP), a factor that has also
been taken into account in the simulations and the calibration of the model.
1
These distinguishing features of the model are described in Section 2, while a more
detailed description  on  data  sources  and  calibration  procedures  can  be  found  in  the
Appendix. Simulations and their results are presented and discussed in Section 3. To
anticipate one important result, it turns out that EU accession (without monetary union)
or the more limited bilateral agreements lead both to an aggregate net welfare gain of
the same magnitude (1-1.2% of Swiss GDP). However, the former includes the Swiss
contribution to the EU budget, which generates by itself an important welfare loss, and
motivates a careful decomposition of all the effects at work. Final comments follow in
Section 4.
2. The model
The model includes three regions of unequal size: Switzerland, the EU and the Rest of
the  World  (ROW),  which  is  the  relevant  disaggregation  to  study  the  impact  of
preferential agreements from the standpoint of a single country. There are 26 sectors,
with  the  main  industrial  sectors  modeled  in  imperfect  competition  and  increasing
returns to scale (see table A2). To capture the effects of budgetary transfer, we assume a
balanced government budget. As for many countries joining the EU, there is  a size
asymmetry between Switzerland and its two big partners, which requires appropriate
                                                
1 An additional factor is the harmonization of public procurement and competition policies, which is also
susceptible to generate welfare gains. Although not considered here, the inclusion of these effects in
simulation models deserves further interest.4
modeling of likely terms of trade effects. For sectors under perfect competition, we
assume that products are differentiated by country (or region) of origin and destination
(the usual “Armington assumption). It is well known that in this framework, the small
country’s term of trade changes induced by trade liberalization are unrealistically strong
an tend to dominate welfare effects (Brown, 1987). To avoid this problem, we assume
very high elasticities of substitution (or transformation) between domestic and foreign
goods  in  the  two  large  regions:  EU  and  ROW  (see  table  A.1).  For  sectors  under
imperfect competition, goods are assumed to be differentiated at the firm level. At the
usual levels of aggregation, this assumption would lead to an underestimation of the
calibrated market power of Swiss firms, because goods from the small country have
minuscule  shares  in  the  large  regions.  To  avoid  such  an  outcome,  each  sector  is
subdivided into sub-sectors, assuming that only a small (and exogenous) share of the
product range is produced by Swiss firms (whereas firms in the EU and ROW cover the
whole range of products).
2.1 Equilibrium in the product market
Separability  assumptions  for  technology  are  depicted  in  figure  1.  Value  added  and
intermediate inputs are combined using a Leontief aggregation function. Different labor
skill  levels  are  considered  as  they  may  play  an  important  role  in  the  case  of
immigration. To account for the empirically well-established complementarity between
capital and high skilled labor and the substitutability between capital and low-skilled
labor (see Hamermesh, 1993), the different skill levels enter the value-added function
twice. First, a “Labor composite 1” (LC1), which is biased towards higher skills, is
combined with capital. Second, the resulting aggregate (capital-LC1) factor is further
combined with a “Labor composite 2” (LC2), biased towards lower skills
2.
                                                
2 The higher skill category (university) only enters LC1 while the lowest skill category (compulsory
school) only enters LC2. The intermediate skill categories are allocated between the two labor composites
as  follows:  2/3  in  LC1  and  1/3  in  LC2  for  superior  education;  1/3  in  LC1  and  2/3  in  LC2  for
apprenticeship (see table A.1 for the calibrated values of elasticities of substitution).5
Figure 1: Production technology
In  (sub-)  sectors  with  imperfect  competition,  each  symmetric  firm  is  assumed  to
produce its own variety of the good. For a firm of country (region) c producing good i,
total cost is given by:








i + = ,[ 1 ]
where tc is total cost, mc marginal cost, fc fixed costs and x the volume of output of the
individual firm.
3 This functional form,  chosen  for  simplicity,  implies  that  fixed  and
variable costs have an identical input composition. Marginal cost is a function of a price
index of value added, and of a price index of intermediate inputs corresponding to the
                                                
3 The production function dual to [1] has the following form:
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i g  is a nested CES function having the structure depicted in figure 1.
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structure  of  production  shown  in  figure  1.  Imposition  of  the  zero-profit  condition,
reflecting the assumption of free entry
4, determines the number of firms in each sector.
Markets are assumed to be segmented, so that a firm from country c chooses a different
price for each market d, 
cd
i p  (net of the output tax rate in country c). Under Cournot
competition, profit maximization yields the usual equation for the markup on a variety
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where 
cd
i ε  is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand in country d for a variety of
good i produced in country c.
We assume that firms consider total expenditure as given, and perceive correctly the
structure of preferences, which is the nested CES utility function represented in figure 2.
It can be interpreted as a multiple-stage budgeting process with an increasing elasticity
of substitution at each step: first a choice is made between goods ( 1 = σ ); then between
regions  of  origin  (
R




i ,σ σ ).  Before  integration,
(figure 2(a)), consumers perceive Switzerland and the EU as different regions, due to
differences in regulations and technical standards. Integration modifies the structure of
preferences  (figure  2(b)),  increasing  the  substitutability  between  products  on  two
counts. First, Swiss and European products are now perceived as originating from the
same  region.  Second,  to  reflect  the  fact  that  standardization  of  products  would  be
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4 Although frequent in such exercises, this convention leads probably to an underestimation of the pro-
competitive effects of integration, and might be replaced by an explicit treatment of the collusion between
firms (e.g. along the lines of Mercenier and Schmitt, 1996).7
Figure 2(a): Preferences before integration
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This  integration-driven  increase  in  substitutability  is  reflected  in  a  higher  perceived
demand  elasticity  which  leads  to  a  fall  in  markup.  It  can  be  shown  that,  prior  to






























































i n   is  the  number  of  firms  producing  good  i  in  country  c,
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i σ ξ − =  and 
cd
i s  is the share of products from country c in country
d’s total consumption of good i’s products.
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where 
crd
i s  is the share of products from country c in country d’s consumption of good
i’s products from a “region” r (the region being either Europe, including Switzerland
and the EU, or the ROW
5).
Hence,  with  a  constant  number  of  firms  and  constant  market  shares,  the  change  in
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5 For example, if c=EU and d=Switzerland, 
crd
i s  is the market share of EU products in total sales in
Switzerland of both EU and Swiss products.9
Note that for ROW firms exporting to Switzerland or the EU, there is no change in the
perceived demand elasticity with integration, since  1 s
crd
i =  in this case. The calibration
procedure,  described  in  Appendix  B,  combines  equation  [5]  with  the  econometric
estimates by Allen et al. (1997) of the fall in markup generated by the SMP, in order to
calibrate the substitution elasticities that appear in table A1.
2.2 Equilibrium in the capital market
To simulate the effects of the integration process in the long run, the determination of
the  stock  of  capital  is  of  crucial  importance.  Investment  and  savings,  and  thus  the
aggregate stocks of capital and wealth, are modeled in a dynamic framework; though
only the long-run (steady-state) equations are used in the numerical model.
6
Consider  first  the  determination  of  the  demand  for  capital  (country  subscripts  are
dropped, unless necessary). In the steady state and in the absence of adjustment costs,
capital demand of a representative firm in sector i and country c is determined by the
















where  i g  is the production function depicted in figure 1,  i mc  the marginal cost, r  the
real interest rate,  i δ  is the depreciation rate, and 
I
i p  is the price of the investment good
used in sector i (the investment good is assumed to be a Leontief composite of goods
from different sectors). As the shadow price of capital is 
I
i p , the value of total capital




i K p V .[ 7 ]
                                                
6  Building  an  intertemporal  CGE  model  with  rational  expectations  (see  Keuschnigg  and  Kohler,
1996).would have necessitated important simplifications in the model structure (imperfect competition,
etc) that are not justified in the present case.10
On the supply side of the capital market, savings result from intertemporal optimization
by  a  representative  individual  with  finite  life  expectancy.  Following  the  “perpetual
youth” model proposed by Blanchard (1985), we assume that the only uncertainty is the
time of death: each individual faces a constant probability of dying, γ , at any moment in
his life (inverse of life expectancy). Thus, at time t, the expected utility of an individual
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where c is the individual’s consumption expenditures, 
T σ  is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and θ  is the rate of time preference.
We  adopt  the  usual  assumption  that  individuals  contract  reverse  life  insurance.  As
shown in Appendix A, it turns out that, in the steady state, total nonhuman wealth, A, is
linked to human wealth, H, through a “savings rate”, s, as follows:
sH A = ;
r ) t 1 (










L Y  is labor income (net of social security contributions), 
T Y  is untaxed net
transfer income, 
D t  is the income tax rate. Note that the stock of savings (nonhuman
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Aggregate  consumption  in  the  steady-state,  C,  can  be  derived  from  human  and
nonhuman wealth as follows:
H ] r ) t 1 [( rA ) t 1 ( C
D D γ + − + − = . [11]11
It follows from [9] and [11] that aggregate consumption, and thus the steady-state level
of welfare (which neglects the costs of transition), depend ultimately only on human
wealth:
H ] r ) t 1 ( rs ) t 1 [( C
D D γ + − + − = . [12]
Hence the accumulation of nonhuman wealth acts as a human-wealth “multiplier”.
In  the  case  of  perfect  international  capital  mobility,  agents  are  indifferent  between
domestic and foreign assets. Thus interest rates are identical across countries, and total
nonhuman wealth in a country is given by A = V + A
*, where A
* are net foreign assets
held by residents of the country. Equilibrium in the world capital market is defined by:
0 A
c c = ∑
∗ , [13]
which is the condition that the sum of excess demand for capital across countries is
zero.
A graphical representation of capital market equilibrium for a small country is depicted
in figure 3. It is assumed that the country is so small that it faces an infinitely elastic
demand (supply) in the world market for financial assets, so that it has no influence on
the world interest rate (
∗ ∗ = r EDA  in figure 3(b)). In the home market (figure 3(a)), a
long-run  demand  curve  for  capital  can  be  derived  by  inverting  equations  [6]  with
respect  to  Ki  and  by  inserting  these  expressions  into  [7].  The  resulting  curve  is
decreasing with respect to the real interest rate. Domestic capital supply is given by
equations [9] and [10] and represented by the upward-sloping curve in figure 3(a). The
stock of net foreign assets, 
∗
0 A , is determined as the difference between capital supply
and  demand,  at  the  world  interest  rate.  When  we  simulate  the  model  in  a  version
without capital mobility, the real interest rate is endogenous in each country and net
foreign assets are fixed at the initial (calibrated) level.
7 In this case the “savings rate” s
varies positively with the interest rate.
                                                
7 Since the world interest rate is hardly affected by Swiss membership in the EU, the interest income
perceived by Swiss residents on these net foreign assets can be considered as being exogenous. Note that
the more natural assumption that net foreign assets are zero would have been very unrealistic in the Swiss
case and  would not  have allowed to compare results  with the perfect-capital-mobility  version of  the
model.12
Figure 3: Capital market equilibrium
Figure 3 also helps to illustrate the difference between our approach and other steady-
state models (Baldwin et al., 1995; Harrison et al., 1996). In these models, the savings
function is not spelled out explicitly. Thus the equilibrium capital stock is obtained by
evaluating  total  capital  demand  at  a  fixed  real  interest  rate.  Net  foreign  assets  are
assumed to be zero, such that nonhuman wealth, A0, is simply equal to the value of the
aggregate  capital  stock,  V0.  This  amounts  to  assuming  implicitly  that  the  savings
function is a horizontal line, at r
*. Obviously, the two approaches are likely to yield
different results. A policy change, such as a reduction in non-tariff barriers, shifts both
curves, to A’ and V’ respectively. In the “traditional” approach, only the shift from V to
V’ matters; it is driven by the increase in capital demand at given interest rates. By
contrast,  in  the  present  model  human  wealth  ultimately  determines  both  nonhuman
wealth  and  the  steady-state  welfare  level.  Thus  steady-state  welfare  changes  are
predominantly driven by labor demand, since labor supply is assumed to be perfectly
inelastic
8.
                                                
8 Labor supply is supposed to be exogenous, as the introduction of a labor-leisure choice in such models






















(a) home market (b) international market13
3. Simulations and results
The following simulations are carried out to capture the implications for Switzerland of
two broad integration scenarios: the bilateral agreements (BIL) or a full EU accession
(ACC). Our preferred estimates are those based on the long-run steady state equilibrium
of the model (endogenous capital accumulation), with perfect international mobility of
capital, though, for the sake of comparison, results obtained with alternative closures of
the capital market (i.e. capital exogenous or endogenous but internationally immobile)
are also mentioned whenever they differ markedly from those obtained in the preferred
version.
Table 1 summarizes, under two alternative closures (static or dynamic), welfare effects
expressed  in  percentage  change  with  respect  to  a  “status  quo”  scenario  in  which
Switzerland does not to undertake any unilateral reform
9. Discussion will move on from
simulations which are common to both integration scenarios (market integration and
free movement of persons), to those which are specific to the EU membership case
(fiscal  consequences,  customs  union  and  monetary  union).  As  welfare  gains  are
expressed in terms of differences between two steady states, they fail to include the loss
from reduced consumption due to capital accumulation during the transition period. In a
sense, this means that our welfare estimates are upper bounds of the true welfare effects
(see Baldwin, 1992). However, in the spirit of the overlapping generations framework
used  here,  they  may  also  be  interpreted  as  reflecting,  for  future  (post-adjustment)
generations, the difference in welfare between alternative scenarios.
Market integration
The bilateral negotiations reduce non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in two areas: transport and
technical barriers to trade (TBTs). In the simulations, these reductions are modeled by a
decrease in trade costs. For the transport sector, we used the estimates of Müller and van
Nieuwkoop (1999), for whom the implementation of the “40-tonners” agreement and
the “New Transalpine Railway” net should lead to a cost-reduction of 0.3% of the value
                                                
9 The base year is 1995. However, to reflect the results of the Uruguay Round agreement, tariff rates are
those applied in 1996. Moreover, VAT rates are raised to 10%, according to the planned adaptation of
social security financing.14
of exports. Regarding TBTs, estimates were derived  from ex-post studies: the gains
from mutual recognition of tests, certificates and approvals in the EU case has been
estimated  at  0.5%  of  export  value  (Single  Market  Review,1998).  As  the  scope  for
standardization is more limited in the Swiss case, and given the important unilateral
harmonization efforts undertaken by Switzerland since 1993, only 10% of this figure
has been applied here.
Table 1: Welfare changes under alternative scenarios
(percentage of GDP)
scenario: Bilateral agreements EU accession
version of the model
a: static dynamic static dynamic
−   Market integration 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.2
of which : reduction of NTBs 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9
−   Free movement of persons 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6
Total bilateral agreements: 0.3 1.0
−   Fiscal consequences: -1.0 -1.5
of which: net transfer -1.0-1.6
−   Customs union: 0.8 0.7
of which: common agricultural policy 0.7 0.6
−   Monetary union 1.1
of which: interest rate differential 0.9
Total EU accession: 0.5 1.2
Total EU accession cum monetary union: 2.5
a: capital assumed to be perfectly mobile internationally in the dynamic case
The resulting decrease of NTBs in the BIL scenario (0.35% of the value of exports)
leads to only modest gains in terms of welfare (between 0.1 and 0.2% of GDP according
to the version of the model, static or dynamic respectively). However, as argued in
section 2, standardization and mutual recognition of tests can be expected to increase
product substitutability. This is captured in  the  simulation  by  a  modification  of  the
structure of preferences calibrated on the decrease in price-cost margins estimated by
ex-post studies (Allen et al, 1997). Again, to control for the  gradual rapprochement
between Swiss and EU regulations, only 25% of the reported decrease in price-cost
margins has been used in the calculations (see table A2 in the Appendix). When added
to  the  previous  reduction  of  NTBs,  this  increase  in  product  substitutability  roughly15
doubles the welfare impact of market integration in the BIL scenario (this is the line
“reduction of NTBs” in table 1).
The same factors operate in the market integration simulation of the ACC scenario.
However,  in  this  case,  effects  are  stronger  for  two  reasons.  On  the  one  hand,
harmonization  is  deeper  in  case  of  EU  membership,  as  it  also  recognizes  the
equivalence of national regulations (known as the “Cassis de Dijon” principle, which
covers approximately a quarter of intra-EU trade). Hence, it is not 10%, but 35% of the
original estimates of the Single Market Review that are considered in this simulation.
By  the  same  token,  the  calibration  of  the  modification  of  preferences  (increased
substitutability) is based on 50% (instead of 25%) of the reported decrease in price-cost
margins estimated by ex-post studies. On the other hand, as for countries in the SMP,
additional benefits can be expected, in the ACC scenario, from the reduction of border
controls  and  transport/insurance  costs  related  to  trade.  The  figures  applied  in  the
simulation are based again on estimates of the Single Market Review (1998) and vary
across sectors
10 (see table A2 in the Appendix).
These  additional  reductions  in  NTBs  lead  to  a  substantial  increase  in  steady-state
welfare gains, which reach 1.2% of GDP in the dynamic version of the model. Of this
figure,  0.9%  corresponds  to  the  sole  reduction  of  NTBs,  which  suggests  that  the
additional impact of product standardization is relatively smaller than suggested by the
results of the BIL scenario
11.
Free movement of persons
Although characterized by a long transition period, the bilateral agreements should lead
in the long run to the same effect as EU membership: free labor movement between
Switzerland  and  the  EU.  Given  the  present  wage  differentials,  Straubhaar  (1999)
estimates  that  net  immigration  flows  would  add  up  to  1.0-1.5%  of  the  resident
                                                
10 Figures for transport/insurance costs are those estimated ex post for Germany. Reduction for border
controls correspond to 50% of the original calculations, as it is estimated that already a half of theses
gains were already reaped by the Single Market program.
11 Another interesting result at the sector level is that the effective decrease in price-cost margins is, on
average, about 30% smaller than the one used in the calibration. This is due to the exit of firms and the
implied increase in concentration that mitigates the fall in  mark-up (detailed results can be found in
Müller and Grether (1999)).16
population. The simulation in table 1 is based on an exogenous increase of 100'000
immigrants (1.4% of resident population), both in the BIL and in the ACC scenario.
Here, results depend a lot on assumptions about capital formation. In the static case,
welfare gains are limited (0.1% of GDP) and wages fall for all skill categories (see table
2). However, if capital is endogenous and internationally mobile, immigration boosts up
investment (1.9%), because the marginal productivity of capital increases, and therefore
leads to a stronger welfare increase (0.6% of GDP), but hardly affects factor prices. If
capital is immobile internationally, the investment increase is still larger (2.7%), and
wages  even  go  up.  This  wage  increase  is  due  to  a  fiscal  externality  effect:  as  it  is
assumed that the same level of public services can be maintained without additional
financing, the larger population allows a lower income tax per capita.
Table 2: Immigration and wage structure: alternative versions of the model
(percentage change with respect to the status quo)
version of the model: static dynamic dynamic dynamic
capital internationally: immobile mobile mobile
skill composition of immigrants
a: neutral neutral neutral skill-biased
Average wage -1.1 0.7 0.0 -0.5
−  university -2.0 1.2 0.0 -5.2
−  superior education -1.1 0.7 0.0 0.9
−  apprenticeship -0.8 0.6 0.1 0.6
−  compulsory school -0.5 0.5 0.1 0.6
User cost of capital 1.4 -0.9 0.0 0.1
a : neutral : identical to the resident population / skill-biased : share of the
highest skill category three times larger than in the resident population.
The previous simulation assumes that the skill structure is identical between the resident
population  and  the  new  immigrants.  However,  recent  surveys  from  the  Statistical
Federal  Office  reveal  that  Swiss  entrepreneurs  complain  about  the  lack  of  skilled
workers,  suggesting  that  the  “pull-effect”  would  be  particularly  strong  for  skilled
migrants.  Therefore,  the  last  column  of  table  2  shows  the  wage  structure  effect  of
assuming that the share of the highest skill category of migrants is three times larger
than in the resident population. As capital and high-skill labor are complementary, this
leads  to  a  stronger  increase  in  investment  and  in  welfare  (2.4%  and  0.7%  of  GDP17
respectively, not shown in table 1), while there is a sharp reduction of the wage rate of
the highest skill category that leads to a fall in the average wage.
The cumulative effects of the bilateral agreements yields a modest impact in terms of
aggregate welfare (1.0% of GDP, see table 1) and in terms of income redistribution
(factor remuneration per capita increases by 0.5% for labor and 1.6% for capital, see
table 3), though the magnitude is close to double in case of EU accession, due to the
stronger reduction of NTBs. However, at this stage, the comparison is incomplete as the
ACC scenario implies a larger bundle of simulations which are described below.
Fiscal consequences
The contribution of Switzerland to the EU budget has been estimated by the Swiss
federal administration at 0.88% of GNP per year. In the simulation, it is financed by an
increase in the VAT tax rates (from 10% to 13%). On its own, this transfer leads to a
considerable welfare loss of 1.6% of GDP in the dynamic version of the model. There
are  two  secondary  burden  of  the  transfer  that  can  only  be  captured  in  a  general
equilibrium framework. First, there is a terms of trade deterioration (-0.3%, not shown
in table 3). Second, the supply of capital is reduced (through  a reduction of 
T Y  in
equation [9]), which leads to a decrease in net foreign assets (alternatively to an increase
in the real interest rate if capital is assumed to be perfectly immobile internationally).
To comply with the minimum EU level, VAT rates have to be increased further to 15%.
It is assumed that the additional resources are used to reduce the direct income tax until
the impact on public budget is neutralized. Adding this simulation to the transfer hardly
affects the net impact of fiscal consequences on aggregate welfare (-1.5% of GDP).
However, the reduction of direct taxation promotes saving (which almost cancels out
the reduction in net foreign assets), while the increase of VAT reduces the incentive to
invest in sectors which are excluded from the VAT base, leading to a decrease in the
capital stock (-1.4%).18
Customs union
The adoption of the customs union is simulated by a discriminatory elimination of trade
barriers between Switzerland and the EU and by the replacement of Swiss by European
trade  measures  on  Swiss  imports  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  This  effect  of  a
discriminatory arrangement is the usual focus of most simulation models (see e.g. the
review of Baldwin and Venables, 1995). The largest changes occur in the agricultural
and food sectors, which are subject of a separate treatment. Instead of tariffs, a broader
measure  of  protection  is  used  for  those  products  where  it  is  available.  It  is  the  ad
valorem tariff equivalent of the domestic support elaborated by the OECD on the basis
of comparisons between domestic and international prices (OECD, 1998).
The degree of tariff and non-tariff protection reflected by these measures appears to be
considerably larger in Switzerland than in most other OECD countries. This explains
why the adoption of the common agricultural policy (CAP) leads to large welfare gains
(0.6% of GDP), in spite of the small size of the Swiss agricultural sector. Most of these
gains are due to improved resource allocation, as results from the static variant of the
model turn out to be of the same magnitude.
12
For all other commodities, the adoption of the common external tariff (CET) is simply
simulated by suppressing all tariffs on Swiss-European trade and by replacing the ad
valorem Swiss tariffs on imports from the rest of the world by their EU equivalents. In
general, Swiss tariffs on imports from the ROW are lower than tariffs applied by the EU
but higher than Swiss tariffs on imports from the EU (this is due to the EU-EFTA free
trade agreement, see last two columns of table A2
13).
On the whole, the inclusion of non-agricultural and non-food products in the customs
union simulation leads to important changes in Swiss trade flows. Imports from the rest
of  the  world  decrease  by  18.8%,  those  from  Europe  rise  by  11.2%  while  both  are
increasing, by 2.3% and 4.5% respectively, in the CAP case. However, there is only a
                                                
12 Note that in the model, agriculture is a constant returns to scale activity while most manufacturing
sectors  are  characterized  by  increasing  returns  to  scale  activities.  Hence,  releasing  resources  from
agriculture to manufacturing gives rise to scale efficiency gains in manufacturing.
13 Data on European tariffs are not reported here for reasons of confidentiality.19
weak additional welfare increase (0.1% of GDP), which suggests that trade creation
effects are almost entirely compensated by trade diversion effects.
Cumulating the effects of “deeper” integration gives a “representative” estimate of the
aggregate net welfare increase of Switzerland’s accession to the EU (1.2% of GDP).
The  difference  with  the  BIL  scenario  appears  to  be  rather  small,  because  of  the
important welfare loss implied by the Swiss contribution to the EU budget. Indeed, in
the ACC scenario, gross welfare gains are almost three times bigger than in the BIL
case and, as indicated in table 3, part of this gain is attributable to improved terms-of-
trade. But to get the full impact of EU accession, one should likely add the effects of
monetary union.
Monetary Union
If Switzerland were to join the  euro-zone,  the  interest  rate  would  have  to  adjust  to
European levels. This is simulated, in the dynamic version of the model (the only one
where  it  makes  sense  to  do  so),  by  the  elimination  of  the  interest  rate  differential,
estimated at 0.75% over the long run by Bärlocher et al. (1999). In terms of figure 3,
this means that initially Swiss firms face a domestic interest rate which is lower than the
one  obtained  by  resident  savers  (a  weighted  average  between  the  domestic  and  the
international rate). With monetary union the difference vanishes. On the one hand, this
leads to a fall in capital stock (-3.4%) and in GDP (-1.1%), while on the other hand,
there is a net steady-state welfare gain of 0.9% of GDP, which is basically driven by a
“wealth effect” reflecting a strong increase in net foreign assets (30.9%).
14 Finally, the
adoption of a single currency would also lead to a reduction in transaction costs. This is
simulated by a further reduction of NTBs of 0.66% on Swiss-European trade and leads
to effects similar to those commented above.
15
                                                
14 In terms of figure 3, this means that the effect of the contraction of the supply schedule driven by the
reduction in wages is more than compensated by the increase in the interest rate on savings.
15  This figure comes from the lower bound estimates of the EC Commission (1990), which is 0.25% of
GDP, applied to the share of bilateral trade with the EU in Swiss GDP (38.1%).20
Table 3: Aggregate results - capital endogenous and perfectly mobile internationally
(percentage change with respect to the status quo)
Bilateral EU accession EU accession
agreements cum monetary
union
GDP 2.0 2.9 2.2
GNP 2.2 3.3 3.8
GDP per capita 0.6 1.5 0.8
Welfare of residents (% of GDP) 1.0 1.2 2.5
Private consumption 3.2 3.9 6.4
Investment 2.4 1.4 -1.5
Total exports 0.7 8.3 3.8
Exports to the EU 1.7 14.5 12.2
Exports to the ROW -1.0 -1.7 -9.9
Total imports 1.8 7.9 8.3
Imports from the EU 2.2 15.5 15.9
Imports from the ROW 0.0 -22.2 -21.7
Capital stock 2.0 1.0 -2.1
Labor 1.4 1.4 1.4
User cost of capital -0.1 0.0 4.0
Average wage rate 0.5 -0.3 -2.8
Wage – university 0.8 0.2 -4.0
Wage – superior education 0.5 0.1 -2.6
Wage – apprenticeship 0.5 -0.5 -2.3
Wage – compulsory school 0.5 -1.4 -2.5
Labor remuneration (per capita) 0.5 -0.4 -2.6
Capital remuneration (per capita) 1.6 2.3 19.5
Disposable income (per capita) 1.8 2.1 4.6
Real interest rate 0.0 0.0 17.5
Stock of assets 3.2 4.2 10.3
Net foreign assets 5.4 10.2 46.4
Real exchange rate -0.2 -2.1 -3.7
Terms of trade 0.2 1.2 2.5
Adding  the  effects  of  monetary  union  to  the  ACC  scenario  roughly  doubles  the
estimated welfare gain, though inequality worsens, as per capita labor remuneration
decreases by 2.6% while per capita capital remuneration increases by 19.5%. However,
these results must be interpreted with particular caution, since they are derived from the
assumption that exchange rate risk is the sole contributor to the interest rate differential
between Switzerland and the EU. There are certainly alternative explanations to this
phenomenon,  such  as  informational  asymmetries  or,  perhaps  more  plausibly,  “safe
heaven” effects, whose incorporation in the model would likely be debatable.21
4. Conclusions
This paper has  developed  a  simulation  model  that  includes  most  of  the  effects  that
should  be  captured  when  a  relatively  small  country  enters  into  a  “deep”  regional
integration arrangement. The distinguishing characteristics include a careful modeling
of some of the mechanisms that would operate under monetary integration, as well as of
the likely effects of market integration in manufacturing activities and of budgetary
transfers. The combination of these effects in a steady-state general equilibrium model
also presents clear advantages over the alternative of a piecemeal approach in which
general equilibrium repercussions (which turn out to be quantitatively important, at least
in the application for Switzerland) would be neglected. Finally, while the application to
Switzerland, like most other ones, can only be expected to yield orders of magnitude,
perhaps these estimates are more robust than previous ex-ante exercises that could not
benefit  from  ex-post  estimates  of  the  competitive  effects  of  the  SMP  on  price-cost
margins in manufacturing activities.
Turning  to  the  application  of  the  model  to  Switzerland,  the  estimates  suggest  an
increase  of  aggregate  welfare  of  around  1%  of  GDP  whether  it  chose  the  bilateral
agreements or full EU membership as an integration strategy. While this estimate may
appear  rather  small,  one  has  to  remember  that  Switzerland,  thanks  to  its  unilateral
harmonization efforts, is today closer to EU legislation than European countries at the
beginning of the nineties. This has been taken into account in the simulations, and partly
explains the small welfare increase. Moreover, if it seems surprising that the accession
scenario (whose scope is a lot wider than the bilateral agreements) does not lead to
higher welfare gains, this is due to the Swiss transfer to the EU budget,  whose net
impact on welfare is neatly captured in the decomposition of EU accession effects.
Of course, it could be argued that the estimated Swiss contribution to the EU, which is
based on existing rules, is rather pessimistic as the rules could be modified in favor of
Switzerland if entry negotiations were actually resumed. However, it is hardly possible
to anticipate the outcome of such negotiations, though these changes in rules could be22
easily incorporated in the model. On the other hand, in other areas, one could argue on
the contrary that scenarios are too optimistic. For example, since 1996, Switzerland has
undertaken reforms that make its agricultural policy closer to the PAC. However, the
PAC being itself under reform, it is  a priori unclear how the incorporation of these
changes would affect the result of the accession scenario.
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Appendix A: Savings Behavior
In the overlapping-generations framework of section 2.2, we assume that agents agree to
leave all their financial wealth a to an insurance company in the case of their death; as a
counterpart, they receive γ a at each time period until their death (reverse life insurance,
see  Blanchard,  1985).  Population  size  is  normalized  to  1.  The  intertemporal  budget
constraint can thus be written:
) t , s ( c ) t , s ( y ) t , s ( y ) t 1 ( a ) t ( r ) t 1 ( ) t , s ( a
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where a dot designates derivation with respect to time, 
L y  is the individual’s labor
income (net of social security contributions), 
T y  net untaxed transfer income and 
D t
the  direct  tax  rate.  Maximizing  [8]  in  the  text  subject  to  [A.1]  yields  the  familiar
necessary condition:
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From  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  and  the  transversality  condition  (which  is
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where h(s,t) is an individual’s human capital, given by:
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We assume that labor income is constant over the life cycle, thus h(s,t)=h(t). Aggregate
consumption is obtained by summing over generations. Let upper-case letters denote
aggregate variables. Hence:
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The dynamic behavior of both human and nonhuman wealth is characterized by the
following system:
()
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Finally, in the steady state, as the interest rate is constant, α  simplifies to:
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α
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Moreover, setting time derivatives to zero in [A.7], and using [A.5] yields:
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which is the aggregate savings equation used in the simulation model (equation [9] in
the main text).
Appendix B: Data and Calibration
The data used for the calibration of the model stem from different sources (for details
see Müller and Grether, 1999). The 1990 social accounting matrix for Switzerland was
updated to 1995. For the two other regions (EU, ROW), we used the GTAP database,
version 4, which is also for 1995 (McDougall et al., 1998). The two data sources were
reconciled  by  retaining,  for  Swiss  imports  and  exports,  data  provided  by  the  Swiss
customs authorities. However, tariff data refer to 1996 for Switzerland and the EU,
because the changes following the Uruguay Round agreement were only introduced in
mid-1995. As European data, which come from the Integrated Data Base (IDB) of the
WTO, correspond to MFN rates, they were corrected to reflect the free-trade agreement
between the EU and Switzerland. Protection data on the agricultural and food sectors
are taken from OECD (1998). The calibration procedure is standard, apart from the
imperfect  competition  and  savings  parameters  described  below,  and    from  the
calculation of Swiss VAT tax rates.
VAT. In Switzerland, a number of sectors (including agriculture) are excluded from the
VAT  base.  As  a  result,  the  usual  equivalence  with  a  tax  on  final  consumption
disappears. Indeed, let S be the set of all sectors,  in S ( ex S ) the subset of sectors included
in  (excluded  from)  the  VAT  base  ( S Sex = \ in S ),  and  ji IC ( ji I )  the  intermediate
consumption of (the investment in) good j by sector i. Then, using the equality between
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where  i C  is final consumption of good i and  i t  is the VAT rate. Summing over all
sectors, total collected VAT becomes:
( ) ∑∑ ∈∈ + +
in ex S iS j ij ij i i ) I IC ( C t , [B.2]
which means that in Switzerland, VAT is both a tax on the final consumption of tax-
included sectors and a tax on the intermediate consumption and the investments in the
tax-excluded sectors. It is in this sense that VAT is modeled and calculated using direct
information from fiscal authorities.
Imperfect competition. The calibration of parameters in imperfect competition sectors
is  only  partly  recursive.  Fixed  costs  are  calibrated  on  the  basis  of  estimated  cost-
disadvantage ratios (CDR), that appear in table A1, and on observed total output of the
sector, 
c
i X . Each sector is subdivided in  i N  symmetric sub-industries (assumed to be
equal to 10 in all sectors), while each sub-industry contains 
c
i n  identical firms. From the
specification of total costs in the main text (equation [1]), and normalizing average cost
to 1 in each sector, the aggregate fixed costs at the subindustry level, 
c







































The  remaining  part  of  the  calibration,  regarding  the  elasticities  of  substitution  in
consumption (figure 2), is based on the simultaneous resolution of a subset of equations.
First, the assumption of zero profits implies a relation between fixed costs and markups.















M µ , [B.5]
where 
cd
i M  are the nominal (observed) imports from country c to country d, 
c
i t  is the
(observed) production tax rate, and 
cd
i µ  is the markup given by equation [3] in the main
text.27
Second,  we  use  the  econometric  estimates  by  Allen  et  al.  (1998)  of  the  change  in
markup of domestic firms after the SMP (see table A.2). These changes in markup,
which appear in the left-hand-side of equation [5] in the main text, are considered as
exogenous in the calibration. Because of the unilateral measures adopted by Switzerland
after  1992, 
cd
i µ ∆  ( c=d=Switzerland)  is  assumed  to  be  equal  to  half  of  the  change
reported by Allen et al. (1998). These authors did not measure the change in markup on
export  markets;  we  assumed  that  the  Swiss  exporters’  change  in  markup  (
cd
i µ ∆ ,
c=Switzerland, d=EU) represents 20 percent of the change in markup on the domestic
market.
As we focus on Switzerland, the  calibration consists then in solving simultaneously
equations [3], [5] and [B.5] for c=Switzerland
16 with respect to 
V
i σ , 
R
i σ  and 
CH
i σ . The
number  of  firms  in  Switzerland, 
c
i n ,  is  estimated  by  the  inverse  of  the  (observed)
Herfindahl  index.  However,  because  of  the  non  linearity  of  the  system,  there  is  no
guarantee that a solution exists. Thus, we relaxed the constraint that the number of firms
is exogenous and minimized an objective function formed by the sum of squares of
relative  deviations  of 
V
i σ , 
R
i σ   and 
CH
i σ   and 
c
i n   from  reference  values  (given  by
5,10,20 and the inverse of the Herfindahl index). Solution values for the elasticities of
substitution are given in table A.1. Finally, given these values, the number of firms in
the EU and the ROW is calibrated from the zero profit conditions by using equations [3]
and [B.5] with c=EU and ROW.
Savings. Finally, for the calibration of aggregate savings, the value of A in the base year
is obtained from estimates of the capital stock plus net foreign assets. Since base-year
values of 
L Y , 
T Y  and 
D t  are also observed, while the real interest rate (r) is set to 5%
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (
T σ ) is set to 0.25, [A.9] can be solved
for γ  (the inverse of life expectancy).
                                                
16 More precisely, equation [A.3] is only considered for c=Switzerland and d=Switzerland or EU.28
Table A1: Calibrated parameters
A) Supply parameters
Elasticities of substitution
 between value-added and intermediate inputs, (σσσσ
Q) 0.0
 between capital and labor (1), (σσσσ
VA) 1.2
 between capital-labor (1) and labor (2), (σσσσ
KL) 0.4
 between labor qualification categories (1), (σσσσ
L1) 0.4
 between labor qualification categories (2), (σσσσ
L2) 1.2
Elasticity of transformation (perfect competition sectors)
 between domestic and exported goods in Switzerland 2.0
 between domestic and exported goods in the EU/ROW ∞
B) Demand parameters
Elasticities of substitution: global
 intertemporal (σσσσ
T) 0.25
between domestic and imported goods (perfect competition sectors):
Switzerland EU/ROW
 agriculture and food (σσσσ
R
1) 2.5 100
 industry and services (σσσσ
R
2) 3.0 100






Other food products 0.08 8.4 19.5 15.6
Beverages and tobacco 0.04 5.7 38.4 25.8
Clothing0.03 10.3 41.4 29.6
Wood 0.05 3.6 25.8 17.9
Paper 0.11 6.3 12.6 10.3
Chemicals, plastics 0.10 7.3 13.3 9.5
Non metal products 0.08 7.6 21.6 15.3
Metals 0.05 6.2 25.2 17.5
Machinery 0.07 13.2 21.1 18.2
Electronics 0.05 9.1 27.8 16.1
See figures 1 and 2 for a description of the parameters.
a Cost disadvantage ratio (share of fixed costs in total cost)29
Table A2: Parameters used in the simulations for traded sectors (percentages)









a transport costs 
b (DESG) from the EU from the ROW
Agriculture 0.60 0.04 n.a. 28.83 45.21
Electricity, gas, water 0.45 0.06 n.a. 0.85 0.90
Meat and dairy products 0.82 0.08 n.a. 152.41 167.30
Other food products 0.82 0.08 -1.25 9.77 8.53
Beverages and tobacco 0.82 0.08 -1.25 12.70 19.78
Textiles 0.82 0.08 n.a. 0.31 3.19
Clothing0.82 0.08 -0.49 2.09 9.48
Wood 0.82 0.08 -1.70 0.08 0.77
Paper 0.82 0.08 -1.70 0.06 0.94
Leather 0.82 0.08 n.a. 0.58 1.78
Chemicals, plastics 0.45 0.07 -2.78 0.06 0.48
Non metal products 0.77 0.08 -1.83 0.09 0.81
Metals 0.80 0.08 -1.70 0.08 0.53
Machinery 1.37 0.10 -0.72 1.06 1.64
Electronics 1.10 0.09 -2.46 0.20 0.40
Commerce 0.50 0.08 n.a.
Transport 1.25 0.08 n.a.
Communication 1.25 0 n.a.
Bank and insurance 1.25 0 n.a.
Other services (private) 0.50 0 n.a.
n.a. not applicable (perfect competition sectors)
a percentage of the value of exports, corresponding to 50% of the original estimates by Single Market Review (1998).
b percentage of the value of exports, corresponding the estimates for Germany by Single Market Review (1998).
c (for imperfect competition sectors only) percentage of producer price corresponding to 50 % of the original estimates by Allen et al (1997).
d tariffs on agricultural and food sectors: based on border measures estimated by OECD (1998), which reflect the wedge between do mestic and
international price / tariffs on non agricultural imports: own calculations based on 1996 data provided from Direction Générale des Douanes.